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Abstract
We examine the effect of mutual fund fee structure on mutual fund exit mode
and timing. The evidence presented herein is consistent with fee maximization
by mutual fund sponsors or managers, increased conflicts of interest for funds
charging 12b-1 fees and higher management fees, and a pecking order for mutual
fund exit method. Specifically, mutual fund exits that result in decreased fee
income are delayed relative to exits that do not and exit strategies that retain
fee income are more likely than strategies that do not.
1. Introduction
Analysis of mutual fund exit depends, at least in part, on how exit is defined.
For our purposes, a mutual fund exits or fails if shareholders’ shares are trans-
formed into shares in another mutual fund or into cash through any mechanism
besides voluntary shareholder redemption. A mutual fund does not fail solely
because it has poor returns; it fails because the fund manager or sponsor is
removed by a vote of the board or because the manager or sponsor no longer
wishes to manage it for the compensation received. Mutual fund boards, acting
in a fiduciary manner, may relieve fund managers or sponsors because the
performance of the fund does not justify the fees that shareholders incur (in-
voluntary removal). Alternatively, since the revenue of a mutual fund investment
company is inherently a variable revenue (calculated as a percentage of assets
under management) and fund sponsorship a voluntary activity, classical eco-
nomics suggests that mutual fund managers or sponsors will give up managing
a mutual fund when the fixed costs of operating it exceed the benefits from fee
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income, including the opportunity cost of diverting limited resources away from
running other funds (voluntary exit).1
The two primary types of managerial mutual fund exit are typically referred
to as merger and liquidation in the existing literature (Zhao 2005; Jayaraman,
Khorana, and Nelling 2002; Khorana, Tufano, and Wedge 2007). Mutual funds
are referred to as merging when the assets of one fund are commingled with
the assets of another fund under either the existing investment management
company or sponsor (within-family merger) or a different investment manage-
ment company or sponsor (between-family merger). A fund is referred to as
having been liquidated when the fund ceases to exist and the value of the shares
is involuntarily redeemed back to the shareholders. This paper focuses on the
characteristics of the fund that are related to how and, more important, when
an investment company stops managing a specific mutual fund through merger
or liquidation.
We investigate the effect that management fees and 12b-1 fees have on observed
mutual fund exit method and timing by using the traditional multinomial logit
analysis and provide a unique contribution by analyzing the timing of exit using
survival analysis. Differing from the previous literature, this paper notes that
these fees represent revenue (cost avoidance) to the sponsor or manager of the
fund.2 If managers or sponsors influence exit method and timing, they will prefer
methods that retain fee income (within-family merger) over methods that do
not (between-family merger and liquidation) and, conditional upon choosing
to exit the fund, will exit later for high-fee funds than for low-fee funds, holding
fund performance constant. Holding performance constant and conditioning
upon ultimate fund exit, boards or managers fulfilling a fiduciary duty will choose
to fail high-fee funds rather than low-fee funds and to do so earlier.
In brief, we find that higher management fees are associated with a lower
likelihood of a fund exit method that results in the loss of such fees (liquidation
or between-family merger) and a higher likelihood of a fund exit method that
results in fee retention (within-family merger). We further find that the liquid-
1 This type of mutual fund exit is in stark contrast to the case in which a mutual fund is not
meeting shareholders’ goals, the board is unresponsive, and the shareholders exit the fund individually
by redeeming the shares—in essence, voting with their feet. The two may, of course, be related. The
issue of board composition and whether boards fulfill their fiduciary duty by inducing involuntary
exit when appropriate is beyond the scope of this paper. By observation, the exits we examine have
occurred and must, therefore, have had board approval when such approval was necessary. Boards
cannot compel managers to stay but can force them to exit. Anecdotal evidence suggests that publicly
observable involuntary exit is a relatively rare occurrence. Renberg (1991, p. M13) notes that fund
“directors have seldom booted an investment adviser, no matter how lousy a fund’s performance.”
By contrast, Khorana (1996) finds that open-end mutual fund managerial turnover is negatively
related to fund performance.
2 Part of the expense ratio represents costs incurred to run the fund as billed by fund management
to fund shareholders. The actual costs of running the fund are not generally observable. An additional
potential conflict of interest beyond that inherent in the compensation arrangement arises when the
services rendered are provided by the entity billing for them, as is frequently the case with mutual
funds.
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ation or between-family merger of high-fee funds is delayed relative to that of
low-fee funds and that the within-family merger of such funds is accelerated.
By delaying the liquidation or between-family merger of high-management-fee
funds, managers and sponsors potentially realize more fee income in what ul-
timately is a fund that is failed. The evidence on choice of exit method is
consistent with rational managerial fee-seeking behavior or shareholder wealth
maximization (cost minimization) behavior, but the timing evidence is, by con-
trast, consistent with a fee-maximization motive with regard to management fee
income for those funds that are ultimately failed.
We do not investigate potential beneficial effects associated with differing fee
structures or differing classes of multiple-share-class funds (which typically have
differing fee structures) in the aggregate but focus instead on the relationship
between such fees and fund failure. Further, the evidence we find does not
preclude potential benefits to shareholders arising from a menu of fee alternatives
but does suggest that, conditional upon ultimate fund exit, shareholders investing
in high-fee funds are likely to see delayed exit and exit methods that retain fee
income for the managers and sponsors over a longer period of time.
Like a large body of existing literature reviewed here, this paper also finds
that 12b-1 fees further exacerbate the conflict of interest inherent in the mutual
fund fee structure. Fund managers that charge a 12b-1 fee are more likely to
merge (between families or within a family) and less likely to liquidate the fund.
As regards the timing of mutual fund exits, we find that it is also related to the
presence and level of 12b-1 fees. Specifically, managers liquidate mutual funds
with 12b-1 fees later than funds without 12b-1 fees.3 Mutual fund managers
merge 12b-1 fee funds more quickly, both within and between family, evidence
consistent with actively seeking to retain or acquire expense alleviation through
12b-1 fees. Taken together, our results suggest that 12b-1 fees are also associated
with a greater likelihood of fund exit and a delay in merging a fund. This evidence
is consistent with the argument of opponents of 12b-1 fees who believe that
they exacerbate the potential for a conflict of interest in fund management.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 details prior research on fund exit,
the impact of 12b-1 fees, and mutual fund investors’ understanding of fund fees.
Section 3 describes the data and sample characteristics, Section 4 presents the
multinomial logit estimations and survival analysis, and Section 5 summarizes
our findings.
3 This delay is also consistent with fund managers’ delaying exit to maintain an out-of-house
distribution channel that directly receives income in the form of a share of the 12b-1 fees. To the
extent that investment companies avoid in-house expenses by using out-of-house distribution chan-
nels, avoidance of supply chain expense implies the same motivations as fee revenue generation and
in-house cost avoidance through pass-through expenses. Our results hold for funds that maintain
the distribution channel through other 12b-1 fee funds (available upon request).
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2. Background
2.1. Mutual Fund Exit
Mutual fund exits have been viewed in finance primarily as an extension of
the corporate finance literature or the industrial organization literature (see
Jayaraman, Khorana, and Nelling [2002] and Zhao [2005], respectively). In these
views, mutual fund mergers occur when the mutual fund manager is not meeting
the performance goals of shareholders, and the board, representing those share-
holders, makes decisions that lead to the dissolution of the fund or the com-
bination of the fund with another fund either under the same manager or a
new manager. Accordingly, most of the likelihood hypotheses offered for the
different methods center around the performance of the mutual fund as reflected
in expense ratios (higher expense ratios mean poorer performance) in absolute
or relative form or the reputation and reporting effect of fund returns on man-
agement (lower returns mean poorer reported performance).4 In short, the ex-
isting literature concludes that funds will be merged or liquidated when their
expenses are high or their returns are low (Jayaraman, Khorana, and Nelling
2002; Khorana, Tufano, and Wedge 2007; Zhao 2005). In this body of research,
mutual fund shareholders, through the board, are the decision-making entities
with respect to mutual fund exits.5 Both of these arguments raise the question,
if shareholders are unhappy with fund performance, why do they not simply
redeem their shares?6
We approach the decision-making process from a related view but one that
permits managers a role in choosing the method and timing of exit. If the
decision-making entity is the fund manager or sponsor in addition to the share-
holders or a fiduciary board, it is not only fund performance and fiduciary duty
that affect the decision to exit the fund but fund management expenses relative
to fund fees as a basic business decision. Unfortunately, actual mutual fund
administrative costs are generally unobservable (Freeman and Brown 2001). A
primary contribution of this paper is the examination of the impact of the level
4 Divestiture to avoid having to report a poorly performing fund and harm the fund manager’s
reputation is often given as a reason for liquidation or for between-family merger when discussing
the effect of returns on the probability of exit where a managerial motive is clearly established. It
is not clear, however, why a fund manager would transfer a fund to another fund manager instead
of liquidating it, or why another fund manager would agree to accept the poorly performing fund.
The answer is fee income. To the manager transferring the fund, this represents an opportunity to
make money by selling the advisory seat; to the manager accepting the fund, this represents potential
future income from an increase in assets under management without a necessary increase in the
expense ratio.
5 Jayaraman, Khorana, and Nelling (2002) and Zhao (2005) take into account the effect of man-
agerial influence or alternative fund characteristics on the merger or liquidation decision to some
degree, but clearly the decision-making focus is on the shareholders or their board, although differing
board characteristics are not examined. Neither study attempts to address directly whether boards
are fulfilling their fiduciary duties in the liquidation or merger decision.
6 There is a large behavioral finance literature that relies on cognitive dissonance to explain why
shareholders would continue to hold a poorly performing fund.
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of management and marketing fees actually charged, instead of the overall ex-
pense ratio, on the exit decision. By using these fees, we are able to more directly
test the impact of managerial compensation, marketing expenses, and pass-
through expenses on exit decisions and the potential role of the manager or
sponsor in the choice of method and timing.
The level of management fees charged represents an expense for mutual fund
shareholders but represents revenue for the mutual fund sponsor. Any distri-
bution expenses retained out of the 12b-1 fees charged also represent direct cost
alleviation of internal expenses for retained 12b-1 fees or avoided commissions
and fees as regards the external distribution channel.7 Wealth-maximizing fund
managers or sponsors as decision makers will prefer exit forms that maximize
their revenues and minimize their unobservable costs, ceteris paribus. Extending
prior research, we derive testable implications for the choice of mutual fund exit
mode and timing that admit as possible the view of mutual fund control pro-
mulgated in the legal literature, as detailed in Freeman and Brown (2001,
p. 615): “The external manager typically controls all facets of fund life, from the
fund’s incorporation through the selection of the initial board. This control tends
not to be relinquished over time, or at least until the advisory office is subse-
quently sold to another external adviser, typically at a very nice profit.”
This is the position taken not only by legal scholars but also by at least one
Securities and Exchange (SEC) commissioner (Manuel Cohen), the Second Cir-
cuit Court (Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, 694 F.2d 923 [2d Cir.
1982]), and Tufano and Sevick (1997). In this view, mutual fund sponsors max-
imize their own wealth, subject to any constraints from competitive markets8
and regulators, and choose exit forms and timing that are consistent with that
maximization.
There is an alternative literature on the role of boards in mutual fund fee
setting, managerial turnover, and fund performance. Tufano and Sevick (1997)
find, in contrast to the above view, that open-end funds whose boards have a
larger proportion of outside directors have lower fees. Rowe and Davidson (2000)
find that closed-end funds have positive-abnormal returns following the replace-
ment of a poorly performing manager but that this is unrelated to board com-
position and structure or the level of insider ownership. Ding and Wermers
(2005) find that having a higher proportion of independent directors is associated
7 Currently, Financial Industry Regulating Authority (FINRA) rules prohibit 12b-1 fee funds from
using more than 75 basis points of the fee to compensate external brokers for marketing and
distribution expenses. Shareholder service fees, which may be included in 12b-1 fees, are paid to
parties, including selling brokers, that respond to inquiries by shareholders or potential shareholders
and cannot exceed 25 basis points, according to FINRA rules.
8 Mutual fund industry proponents generally contend that the very large number of competitors
is a clear indication of rampant competition, although economically having a large number of
competitors is not a necessary or sufficient condition to conclude that a market is fully competitive.
Industry critics contend that the persistence of high and increasing expense ratios, even with an
increasing number of participants, is an indicator of a lack of competitiveness, a conclusion supported
by General Accounting Office (2000) and Securities and Exchange Commission (1966).
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with a higher likelihood of replacing an underperforming manager. Adams,
Mansi, and Nishikawa (2009) find that managers of funds with large boards are
less likely to be replaced than those of funds with small boards. Meschke (2007)
finds that fund performance is unrelated to board independence but that having
an independent board chair is associated with lower aggregate expenses and
higher management fees. Khorana, Tufano, and Wedge (2007) find that across-
family mergers benefit shareholders and are associated with a larger percentage
of independent trustees but that the effect is strongest when 100 percent of the
board is independent. From these observations and the following information
on 12b-1 fees, we derive the pecking-order hypothesis in Section 2.3.
2.2. The Role of 12b-1 Fees
In 1980, the SEC relaxed a long-standing ruling that prohibited fund managers
from using the assets of the fund to pay for fund distribution expenses. It had
long been believed that such fees, now known as Rule 12b-1 fees, exacerbated
the conflict of interest created by the nature of external fund management.
Subsequently, a large body of academic inquiry has concluded that 12b-1 fees
are a deadweight cost to shareholders (Ferris and Chance 1987; McLeod and
Malhotra 1994; Livingston and O’Neal 1998), and perhaps more than a dead-
weight cost (Dukes, English, and Davis 2006).9 We do not focus on 12b-1 fees
as a deadweight cost but rather on their impact on mutual fund exit method
and timing.
The effect of 12b-1 fees on the fee structure and cost alleviation, and therefore
on the probability and timing of mutual fund exit, is important for several
reasons. First, research shows that such fees are rarely understood by fund share-
holders (Jones and Smythe 2002; Jain and Wu 2002; Capon, Fitzsimmons, and
Prince 1996) and may represent a way for fund managers to hide a source of
revenue. This is also believed to be the case by some regulators, as evidenced
by the comments of Andrew Donohue, director of the SEC’s Division of Invest-
ment Management, who stated, “Many investors do not understand rule 12b-1,
the services that 12b-1 fees pay for, or even the fact that 12b-1 fees are being
deducted from their fund investments” (Donohue 2008). If shareholders do not
understand such fees, managers may be able to substitute 12b-1 fees for man-
agement fees without experiencing the same potential negative perception asso-
ciated with higher management fees. In other words, the elasticity of substitution
between 12b-1 fees and management fees may not be perfect. Second, following
Dukes, English, and Davis (2006), we find that the presence of a 12b-1 fee may
be indicative of other above-average charges by the fund manager. Finally, a primary
goal of the SEC in the decision to allow 12b-1 fees was to increase the probability
of survival for mutual funds with such fees (Freeman 1978). We provide a unique
contribution to the literature on mutual fund exits by examining the actual level
9 Freeman (1978) provides an excellent review of the legal proceedings leading up to the permis-
sibility of 12b-1 fees.
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of 12b-1 fees charged (as opposed to the maximum) by separating out the effect
of 12b-1 fees from management fees and by examining their impact on the
timing of mutual fund exit and the choice of exit method.
2.3. Proposed Model of Mutual Fund Exit
We propose a pecking order of mutual fund exit. According to the pecking
order, we propose that the manager employs the following decision process:
Determine whether the fund’s variable revenue exceeds its portion of the fixed
costs and the opportunity cost of not employing the resources elsewhere.10 If it
does, continue managing the fund. If the excess is high enough, the fund will
continue to stand alone (survive). If it does not, determine whether the advisory
seat can be sold for an amount in excess of any cost associated with the effort
and time to sell it and in excess of the reputation effects from selling it. Then
compare this amount to the value of merging the potentially exiting fund with
another fund in the same family, including any reputation costs of reporting
combined fund performance, accounting costs, reduction in fund-specific fixed
costs, and so on. If a within-family merger provides the necessary decrease in
fixed costs while retaining revenue, and any potential sale price results in a lower
net benefit to fund managers, merge the fund within the family subject to board
approval. If the sale price, which generally cannot be observed, is greater than
the present value of the lost revenue net of costs, sell the fund subject to board
approval to do so. If the board will not approve the within-family or between-
family merger or if no buyer is available, abandon the fund (an action for which
the manager or sponsor does not need board approval). The board may then
seek an external manager or liquidate the fund. Because the sale price and fund
manager’s costs are generally not observable, direct tests comparing the two
cannot be conducted. The best feasible alternative is to conduct tests on the
relative probability and timing of the different exit strategies to determine
whether those effects are consistent with the proposed model.
In liquidation, the fund manager or sponsor receives nothing but potential
reputation effects. There is a potential for negative reputation effects from aban-
donment and positive effects from removal of a poor performer according to
reported performance. Any family-wide fixed costs remain, although variable
costs and any fund-specific fixed costs are eliminated. In a between-family merger
(more properly termed a sale in this view), the selling fund adviser or sponsor
10 Fund managers consulted during the early phases of this project presented a number of mo-
tivations for shutting down a fund, but all were inherently based on the relationship between the
revenue garnered from running the fund and the costs associated with running it, including the
opportunity cost of the fund manager’s time. Various versions of statements such as “we run the
fund until we know whether or not it will make money” were commonplace. The evidence regarding
fee waivers presented in Christoffersen (2001) is consistent with this view. Since we are using the
actual level of fees charged, waivers are incorporated into our analysis. The mutual fund incubation
process, as detailed in Evans (2010), typically relies on taking privately managed unregistered pools,
frequently seeded by the sponsor, and creating publicly managed mutual funds out of the top per-
formers.
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receives the sale price for the advisory seat net of any legal costs, any remaining
flows from service arrangements with the new fund sponsor, and the net rep-
utation costs or benefits associated with removing a low-surplus fund. The pur-
chasing fund manager, by contrast, gains the fee income associated with the new
fund but takes on the task of improving fund performance and the costs as-
sociated with the purchase (sale price, integration costs, fixed and variable op-
erating costs). In a within-family merger (business combination), the fund man-
ager retains the fee income, gains any economies of scale through reduced
fund-specific fixed costs, potentially lowers reputation costs by reducing publicity
about negative performance, and reduces any costs from perceived abandonment
by abandoning a poorly performing strategy but not abandoning the share-
holders.
For both the method and timing of fund exit, mutual fund characteristics fall
into two categories: (1) those that create alternatives to exiting (number of
portfolios at the family and objective levels, number of classes at the portfolio
level) through a potential agglomeration and reduction of mutual fund operating
costs and (2) those that represent the future benefits of fund management and
therefore mitigate the incentive to exit for the fund sponsor (better performance,
higher inflow, more classes, higher management fees, adoption or existence of
12b-1 fees). These are the same characteristics that make the portfolio potentially
more attractive to an acquirer. Tables 1 and 2 summarize our hypotheses re-
garding these variables with a focus on the effect of the management fees and
the 12b-1 fee on the timing and method of fund exit, and they present the
hypothesized and estimated effects detailed in Zhao (2005) and Jayaraman, Kho-
rana, and Nelling (2002).
We hypothesize that the variables representing cost-reducing alternatives to
exiting will have positive logit coefficient estimates (increased probability) for
within-family mergers and negative logit coefficient estimates (decreased prob-
ability) for between-family mergers and liquidations. Likewise, the variables that
represent higher potential revenues to existing fund managers or sponsors are
hypothesized to have positive logit coefficient estimates for within-family mergers
and negative logit coefficient estimates for liquidations. Exit method represents
only part of the exit decision; exit timing represents the other. We hypothesize
that factors that increase the exit alternatives will result in earlier timing (shorter
life spans, higher hazard, positive hazard coefficient estimates) for within-family
mergers and later timing (longer lives, lower hazard, negative hazard coefficient
estimates) for between-family mergers and liquidations. Factors that represent
higher potential revenues should be associated with later exit for within-family
mergers and liquidations (lower hazard, negative coefficient estimates) if man-
agers or sponsors are the effective decision-making entities and earlier exit (higher
hazard, positive coefficient estimates) if fiduciary boards or shareholders are the
primary decision-making entities.
When a fund is liquidated, both the variable costs and revenues from managing
the fund are eliminated. We hypothesize that the loss of fund revenue results in
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Table 1
Summary of Existing Hypotheses and Evidence: Probability of
Within-Family and Between-Family Mergers
Zhao (2005)
Jayaraman, Khorana,
and Nelling (2002)
This Study
Variable Hypothesized Found Hypothesized Found
Hypothesized
Probability
Hypothesized
Hazard
Within-family merger:
Family level:
Portfolios  N.A.  
Inflow – N.A. – –
Performance ? N.A. ? –
Objective level:
Portfolios –   ? 
Inflow – ? – –
Performance – N.A. –
Portfolio level:
Size – –  – –
Inflow – N.A. – –
Age  N.A. – –
Performance – –  – –
Classes  N.A.  
Expense ratio:   
Pass-through expense N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.  –
Management fee N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.  –
12b-1 Fee N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.  –
Between-family merger:
Family level:
Portfolios   N.A. – –
Inflow –  N.A. – –
Performance ? N.A. – –
Objective level:
Portfolios – –  – –
Inflow – ? – –
Performance – N.A. – –
Portfolio level:
Size –  –  – ?
Inflow –  N.A. – –
Age  N.A. – –
Performance – ? – –
Classes  N.A. – –
Expense ratio:  
Pass-through expense N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. /? ?
Management fee N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. /? –
12b-1 Fee N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. /? ?
Note. A question mark indicates a hypothesized indeterminate effect. Coefficient estimates for timing
are the estimated effect on the hazard of the event for each characteristic. A negative coefficient estimate
indicates decreased hazard at any given point in time, which is interpreted as delayed timing of the exit.
a decreased probability of liquidation for the funds with high management fees
and high 12b-1 fees and later timing for the same if managers or sponsors are
the primary decision-making entities. This is in contrast to the hypothesis and
findings of Zhao (2005) with respect to expense ratios in the aggregate.
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Table 2
Summary of Existing Hypotheses and Evidence: Probability of Liquidation
Zhao (2005)
This Study
Variable Hypothesized Found
Hypothesized
Probability
Hypothesized
Hazard
Family level:
Portfolios   – –
Inflow – – –
Performance  – –
Objective level:
Portfolios ? – –
Inflow – – –
Performance – – –
Portfolio level:
Size –  – –
Inflow –  – –
Age –  – –
Performance –  – –
Classes – – –
Expense ratio:  
Pass-through expense N.A. N.A. – –
Management fee N.A. N.A. – –
12b-1 Fee N.A. N.A. – –
Note. A question mark indicates a hypothesized indeterminate effect. Coefficient estimates for timing are
the estimated effect on the hazard of the event for each characteristic. A negative coefficient estimate
indicates decreased hazard at any given point in time, which is interpreted as delayed timing of the exit.
3. Data
We employ quarterly data from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) Survivor-Bias-Free Mutual Fund Database for 1999–2007. The data in-
clude the actual level of fees charged as management fees and 12b-1 fees after
1998, in contrast to the previously available CRSP mutual fund data, which
included only the stated maximums and the actual expense ratios. The sample
we derive from this database has an average size of approximately 16,000 ob-
servations per year if we consider each class of a multiple-share-class fund as a
separate fund and approximately 7,000 funds per year if we consider only unique
asset compositions (portfolios). The database uniquely identifies the underlying
portfolio for part of the sample and represents another incremental contribution
of our analysis.11 Objective classification follows the Lipper objective-code in-
vestment classifications in the CRSP mutual fund database guide, and we employ
11 Authors of prior research (for example, Zhao 2005) did not have access to a unique portfolio
identifier and so used fund name, net asset value, return, and turnover ratio to determine the number
of unique portfolios. Since the matches are not always exact, this process introduces the potential
for additional measurement error into the estimations, particularly those that include family and
portfolio effects. For the early years (1999–2002), when the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) unique portfolio identifier is not available, we follow Zhao (2005). For the later years (2003–
7), we use the unique identifier.
This content downloaded from 129.015.064.250 on October 10, 2016 13:45:49 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Mutual Fund Exit 733
modifications as in Zhao (2005) and Jayaraman, Khorana, and Nelling (2002)
to create a small-company growth fund objective.
We measure the performance of the fund as in Zhao (2005), wherein port-
folio performance is the asset-weighted average of the portfolio holding-period
returns; objective performance is the asset-weighted average of the portfolio
holding-period returns within an objective, excluding the portfolio for which
this variable is calculated; and family performance is the asset-weighted average
of the objective-adjusted portfolio returns within the family, excluding the port-
folio for which this variable is calculated. The single-factor alpha value is mea-
sured using the capital asset pricing model for equity portfolios and the single-
factor model employed in Jayaraman, Khorana, and Nelling (2002) for bond
portfolios. Multifactor alpha values are computed using the Fama and French
(1993) three-factor model for equity portfolios and a four-factor model from
the Jayaraman, Khorana, and Nelling (2002) methodology for bond portfolios.
Management fees are measured as the actual level of management fees to net
assets as reported by the fund at the share class level. The 12b-1 fee is measured
as the level of 12b-1 fee reported by the fund at the share class level. Pass-
through fees are measured as the expense ratio minus the management and
12b-1 fees at the share class level. Size is measured as the total net asset value
of the fund in the summary statistics and as the natural logarithm of total net
asset value in the multinomial logit and survival estimations. Inflow is measured
as the total net flow of redemptions and initiations as reported at the share class
level divided by total net asset value (asset growth rate net of portfolio return).
Portfolio age is the length of time the portfolio has been in existence, in quarters.
Classes indicate the number of unique share classes in the portfolio.
Table 3 contains summary statistics for our sample segmented along different
fund types, Table 4 contains tests of difference in median for the summary
statistics segmented by exit mode, and Table 5 segments the sample by year
across the sample period. The reported medians are for the entire aggregate
sample period, 1999–2007.
As expected, surviving portfolios are larger than nonsurviving portfolios and,
in general, older (see Table 3 for medians and Table 4 for differences). Consistent
with the pecking-order hypothesis of fund exit, funds that are merged between
families are older than surviving funds and older than funds that are merged
within a family. Liquidated funds are younger than both surviving funds and
merged funds. Managers, sponsors, and boards decide early whether to liquidate
and then progress to choosing between merging within the family or selling the
fund (a between-family merger). It presumably takes time to identify a buyer
and agree to a suitable price, which results in between-family mergers for older
funds. Surviving funds have better performance than nonsurviving funds. There
is some evidence that liquidated funds have worse performance than merged
funds and some evidence that funds merged within a family may have worse
performance than those merged between families.
From the standpoint of fees, surviving funds have significantly lower pass-
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Table 3
Summary Statistics (Medians), 1999–2007
Method of Exit
Surviving Exiting Liquidated
Within-Family
Merger
Between-Family
Merger
Objective-adjusted
performance (%):
Quarterly 1.406 .443 .284 .843 .286
Annual 5.933 4.586 2.740 5.345 5.757
Single-factor a .170 .171 .179 .196 .092
Multifactor a .092 .137 .167 .117 .092
Characteristics:
Size ($ millions) 230.600 40.550 14.900 62.200 84.600
Quarterly inflow (%) 1.220 .287 .163 .652 .252
Fund age (quarters) 6.242 5.867 4.997 6.001 6.902
Portfolio age (quarters) 9.246 7.247 5.517 7.997 8.994
Overall expense ratio 1.250 1.450 1.235 1.570 1.500
Pass-through expense (%) .127 .171 .408 .137 .201
Management fee (%) .556 .520 .347 .600 .584
12b-1 Fee (%) .250 .250 .100 .350 .250
Portfolios:
N 8,635 900 920 355
% 79.880 8.326 8.511 3.284
through expenses than exiting funds, regardless of exit mode. They tend to have
higher management fees and 12b-1 fees than liquidated funds but lower man-
agement fees and 12b-1 fees than funds merged within a family. This is consistent
with fund managers or sponsors exiting funds with low fee income and retaining
funds with high fee income within a family, further evidence of which can be
observed in the difference between medians for different exit classifications.
Liquidated funds have lower fees in both categories than funds that are ultimately
merged. Funds merged within a family have higher fees than funds merged
between families.
Funds that are liquidated are significantly smaller and younger than funds
that are merged, which is further evidence in support of the pecking-order
hypothesis. They have significantly higher pass-through expenses and signifi-
cantly lower management fees and 12b-1 fees, also consistent with our hypothesis
that there is a pecking order to mutual fund exit choice. Managers or boards
appear to decide early in a fund’s life in terms of both size and age if the fund
should be exited via liquidation, and that decision is associated with funds
charging low fees. The same is true with a between-family merger, although
exiting fund sponsors may receive unobserved compensation for the advisory
seat from the acquiring manager or sponsor. Funds that are merged within a
family tend to be smaller and younger than funds merged between families.
They tend to have higher management and 12b-1 fees and lower pass-through
expenses. They also tend to have somewhat poorer performance, although evi-
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dence of this is mixed. These differences are also consistent with fee retention
by managers or sponsors and the pecking-order hypothesis. Managers and spon-
sors appear to prefer to retain fee income and cost alleviation via a within-family
merger rather than lose it to a between-family merger or liquidation. The result
of this preference is that, for high-fee funds, within-family merger occurs earlier
in life than sponsor exit via between-family merger. The difference in between-
family merger and within-family merger asset size suggests that larger funds are
more attractive candidates for sale. The evidence in Tables 3 and 4 is consistent
with a pecking order for mutual fund exit that appears related to fee generation
and cost alleviation.
The number of portfolios increases from 1999 to 2001 and then decreases to
approximately initial levels in 2007 (see Table 5), with portfolios containing
12b-1 classes representing a slightly greater portion of the existing funds in 1999
than in 2007. The number of funds (individual share classes within the multiple-
share-class structure) increases across the sample period by about 50 percent
(from 12,924 to 18,254), which reflects the increasing popularity among fund
managers of the multiple-share-class structure. This is consistent with 12b-1 fee
funds having a lower failure rate across a fixed period of time and with more
new funds having 12b-1 fees, as detailed in Dukes, English, and Davis (2006).
The median sizes of portfolios with 12b-1 fees and those without 12b-1 fees
generally increase over this period, although there are periods of decrease and
the difference is not consistently greater with either type.12 Both types of portfolios
have net negative inflows over the sample. Using only the fraction of funds in
each exit category, we find that there are no readily apparent differences in choice
of exit mode over time or between classifications.
4. Results
4.1. Empirical Design
Allison (1995) states that the multinomial logit (MNL) method by itself pro-
vides an incomplete picture of exit behavior because it addresses the choice of
exit method and ignores exit timing.13 Accordingly, we follow his advice and
estimate the effect of different fund characteristics on exit choice using MNL
and on exit timing using Cox regression. We begin by following Zhao (2005)
and Jayaraman, Khorana, and Nelling (2002) and employ MNL analysis to de-
12 In Table 5, we classify multiple-share-class portfolios with a 12b-1 fee share class as 12b-1 fee
portfolios for the purpose of clarity in the discussion of 12b-1 fee adoption patterns. The aggregate
dollar amount of total net assets in 12b-1 fee funds, as opposed to portfolios, is smaller than the
total net asset value of funds without 12b-1 fees.
13 Multinomial logit (MNL) analysis also equally weights the effect of observations of the merged
fund after the merger occurs rather than only the impact of information known to the decision-
making entities at the time of exit decision.
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termine the effect of mutual fund fee structure on mutual fund exit.14 We extend
prior studies by decomposing the expense ratio into the actual management fee
charged, the 12b-1 fee charged, and the pass-through fees (defined as the dif-
ference between the expense ratio and the sum of management and 12b-1 fees)
to assess the effect of these fees on the choice and timing of fund exit method.
Finally, we add to the existing evidence on fund exit decisions by using Cox
regression with time-dependent covariates to conduct survival analysis on the
different classifications of fund exit and levels of managerial and 12b-1 fees to
assess their effect on the timing of the exit.
4.2. Effect of Fees on the Probability of Different Exit Modes
Table 6 presents coefficient estimates for the types of mutual fund exit inclusive
of the impact of pass-through fees, management fees, and 12b-1 fees. We employ
an extension of the empirical design found in Zhao (2005) and estimate one
specification (model 1) at the fund level and another at the family level (model
2). Improving and refining the expense ratio findings of Jayaraman, Khorana,
and Nelling (2002) and Zhao (2005), we find that the probability of a within-
family merger is positively associated with the level of management fees as well
as 12b-1 fee cost alleviation. This is consistent with the overall expense ratio
evidence in Jayaraman, Khorana, and Nelling (2002) but in contrast to Zhao
(2005).15 Furthermore, we find, also in contrast to the Zhao (2005) expense ratio
evidence, that the level of fees as captured by the 12b-1 fee and management
fees is negatively associated with the probability of liquidation. For between-
family mergers, the level of 12b-1 fees is associated with a higher likelihood of
between-family mergers, while management fees negatively impact the likelihood
when controlling for family- and objective-level influences, including fund per-
formance. The management fee evidence for liquidations and between-family
mergers is consistent with mutual fund managers and sponsors with board ap-
proval preferring exit methods for funds with high fee levels that avoid losing
the fee income, an argument investigated further in the succeeding tables.
Higher levels of 12b-1 fees increase the likelihood of both within- and between-
family mergers. This is consistent with exiting fund managers or sponsors trying
to retain 12b-1 fees or acquiring fund managers or sponsors valuing them when
they are willing to purchase a fund. High management fees are associated with
an increased probability of a within-family merger and a decreased probability
of a between-family merger. Within-family mergers of funds with high man-
agement fees and high 12b-1 fees allow fund managers to keep the revenue,
14 A replication of the MNL tables in Zhao (2005), along with a table condensing and summarizing
the characteristics of merged funds before and after, as in Jayaraman, Khorana, and Nelling (2002),
is available upon request.
15 When we replicated the findings in Zhao (2005) for our sample period, it was brought to our
attention by a representative of CRSP that the Survivor-Bias-Free Mutual Fund database changed
data providers and was backfilled over time. Any resulting differences in findings may be attributable
to the backfilling process and are not necessarily shortcomings of the initial research.
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which makes them preferable to liquidation or between-family mergers from a
revenue-generation standpoint. If managers or sponsors choose an exit method
to generate or retain fee income, as the evidence in Table 6 suggests, they may
also choose the timing of exit to further achieve the goal. The lower portion of
Table 6 provides the estimated economic impact of a 1 percent change in each
variable on the probability of each exit method, assessed at the rate at which
each exit choice is observed in the sample. The interpretation of the management
fee coefficient estimate for model 1 and liquidation would then be that if man-
agement fees increase by 1 percent, the probability of liquidation decreases by
1.80646 percent at the aggregate probability of a liquidation of 8.326 percent.
Examining only the likelihood of each exit method provides an incomplete
picture of the exit decision. The examination of the timing of the exit completes
that picture, and this aspect of exits is appropriately explored using survival
analysis.
4.3. Effect of Expenses on the Timing of Different Exit Modes
We employ survival analysis techniques to assess whether the survival rate of
funds differs among exit modes. We begin this process by examining the impact
of high management fees and high 12b-1 fees on fund survival distributions and
then refine and extend these findings using Cox regression to precisely estimate
the impact of the differing fund characteristics on fund survival (exit). Figures
1, 2, and 3 present the survival curves for funds with management fees in the
top quartile16 exiting via liquidation, within-family merger, and between-family
merger, respectively. The solid lines indicate the survival distribution of funds
with management fees in the bottom three quartiles over time, and the dotted
lines indicate the survival distribution of funds with management fees in the
top quartile over time. Wilcoxon tests of equality between strata reject equality
at p p .0056 (Figure 1), p ! .0001 (Figure 2), and p p .8846 (Figure 3).
As can be seen, fund managers delay liquidation of funds with high man-
agement fees, thereby retaining the fee income longer for funds that will ulti-
mately fail. By contrast, funds that have high management fees and are ultimately
merged within a family are exited more quickly. The difference in survival curves
for both liquidation and within-family merger is statistically detectible at the p
p .01 level or better. There is no detectable difference due to high management
fees associated with between-family mergers.
Similar evidence exists for funds with 12b-1 fees in the top quartile. Figures
4–6 present the survival curves for exiting funds in this classification. The solid
lines indicate the survival distribution of funds with 12b-1 fees in the bottom
three quartiles over time, and the dotted lines indicate the survival distribution
of funds with 12b-1 fees in the top quartile over time. In Figures 4 and 5,
Wilcoxon tests of equality between strata reject equality at p ! .0001; in Figure
6, a Wilcoxon test of equality between strata fails to reject equality at pp .7465.
16 The results are qualitatively and statistically similar if we use the top two quartiles.
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Figure 1. Survival curves for funds in the top 25 percent of management fees: liquidations
Figure 2. Survival curves for funds in the top 25 percent of management fees: within-family
mergers.
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Figure 3. Survival curves for funds in the top 25 percent of management fees: between-
family mergers.
Just as with high management fees, high 12b-1 fees lead to delayed exit by
liquidation and early exit via within-family merger. The survival functions are
statistically different at the p p .001 level or better. This evidence also supports
the hypothesis that managers choose exit methods that delay the loss of cost-
alleviating fees and accelerate techniques that maintain cost alleviation within a
family. Accelerated within-family merger may also occur because managers wish
to realize economies of scale more quickly or because there is no compelling
reason for differential timing (no loss of fee income). The differing results for
liquidation, within-family mergers, and between-family mergers suggest that
there are other factors at work in addition to those captured by the survival
plots. Accordingly, we estimate a hazard model to assess the effect of various
fund characteristics on the timing of mutual fund exit decisions.
Allison (1995) recommends Cox regression as the appropriate technique for
assessing the effect of time-varying covariates on the survival distribution. Table
7 contains coefficient estimates for the effect of a series of time-varying covariates
on the hazard of different classifications of mutual fund exit. We follow the
MNL estimations and calculate coefficient estimates from Cox regression with
time-varying covariates for multiple-fund families for model 1, which includes
only fund-level variables, and model 2, which includes variables for fund level,
objective level, and family level. The partial likelihood method underlying Cox
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Figure 4. Survival curves for funds with 12b-1 fees in the top quartile: liquidations
Figure 5. Survival curves for funds with 12b-1 fees in the top quartile: within-family mergers
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Figure 6. Survival curves for funds with 12b-1 fees in the top quartile: between-family
mergers.
regression makes estimation of each survival partial likelihood function inde-
pendent of the estimation of the other partial likelihood functions.
Higher management fees and 12b-1 fees increase the hazard (lead to earlier
exit timing) for within-family mergers. Funds with high management fees and
high cost amelioration through 12b-1 fees are merged within a family more
quickly than funds with lower fees, consistent with retaining the fee income and
cost alleviation. High 12b-1 fees and management fees decrease the hazard of
liquidation (later timing). This is consistent with fund managers or sponsors
with board approval delaying the elimination of management fees and 12b-1
fees for funds that are ultimately failed. Larger portfolios are failed later regardless
of exit method, and older funds have a lower risk of liquidation, consistent with
exit decisions being made early in a fund’s life. Having more funds available
within family decreases the risk of liquidation or between-family merger (length-
ens life) and increases the hazard of within-family merger (shortens life). Having
a greater number of objective-level portfolios is associated with decreased hazard
of liquidation but increased hazard of within-family merger. Perhaps a lower
allocation of fund-specific fixed costs causes within-objective funds to share the
costs specific to investments in the objective area (for example, information
costs). Taken together with the MNL results, these results are consistent with
fund managers or sponsors delaying the transfer of high-fee assets to retain the
revenues associated with higher fees. They choose both the method and timing
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Table 7
Survival Analysis of Fund Characteristics on Timing of Exit
Variable
Liquidation
(1)
Within-Family
Merger
(2)
Between-Family
Merger
(3)
Model 1:
Portfolio level:
Size .45958** .43081** .26870**
Inflow (t  1) 2.38304** 1.46507 .03501
Inflow (t  2) .88642 1.10340** 1.06179
Age .02595** .00656** .00940*
Performance (t  1) 2.74680** 2.12533* 2.48597**
Performance (t  2) 2.49336** 2.00277** 2.02613*
Classes .08264** .13889** .06082*
Fees and expenses:
Pass-through expense .00564 1.75602 .70375
12b-1 Fee 73.33841** 54.69530** 25.19630**
Management fee 14.92098** 34.83946** .89999
R2 .08708 .05112 .01176
Model 2:
Family level:
Portfolios .00576** .00384** .03838**
Inflow (t  1) .03139 .02173 .01326
Inflow (t  2) .04187** .00401 .00381
Performance (t  1) .77812 2.26360* 5.96776**
Performance (t  2) 2.62674** 4.91745** .30907
Objective level:
Portfolios .00024** .00059 ** .00010
Inflow (t  1) 6.57015** 6.47794* 7.42052
Inflow (t  2) .51595 .00058 .05022
Performance (t  1) 7.28542** 2.10870 ** 5.01876
Performance (t  2) 3.44197** 2.33755 ** .41752
Portfolio level:
Size .46328** .44229** .19073**
Inflow (t  1) 2.86145* 1.88507 .21841
Inflow (t  2) .85627 1.19298** .91230
Age .02959** .00868** .00325
Performance (t  1) 3.80572** 5.12622** 3.23745**
Performance (t  2) 4.12982** 3.88739** 2.70064*
Classes .03637 .11867** .10042**
Expense ratio:
Pass-through fee .00727 3.78773 .00001
12b-1 Fee 73.89424** 55.30636** 49.96278**
Management fee 16.94183** 40.03555** 8.50011*
R2 .0879 .0599 .0386
Note. Specifications for model 2 are separate estimations, unlike the earlier joint estimations. Values are
Cox regression coefficients for the three modes and two models. The estimated models incorporate the
partial likelihood time-varying nature of the covariates through Cox regression. The variable effects on each
method can then be estimated independent of the effects on each other method. The dependent variable
in each specification is the hazard of each exit method at each point in time for the sample period 1999–
2007 at quarterly intervals. Quarterly and yearly indicator variables are omitted since the time-varying
nature of the estimation accounts for timing differences. N p 20,927.
* Significant at p ! .05 or better.
** Significant at p ! .01 or better.
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Table 8
Wald Test p-Values for Coefficient Differences
Variable (1) – (2) (1) – (3) (2) – (3)
Family level:
Portfolios ! .0001** ! .0001**
Inflow (t  1) .8594 .8217 .9013
Inflow (t  2) .0888 .4418 .8790
Performance (t  1) .3972 .0003** ! .0001**
Performance (t  2) .2160 .1487 .0147*
Objective level:
Portfolios ! .0001** .0496* .0008**
Inflow (t  1) .0014** .0679 .9106
Inflow (t  2) .4267 .3904 .6588
Performance (t  1) .0264* .1145 .7323
Performance (t  2) .4083 .0705 .2073
Portfolio level:
Size .3162 ! .0001** ! .0001**
Inflow (t  1) .6489 .1433 .3076
Inflow (t  2) .6618 .9601 .7821
Age .0000** .0003** .3111
Performance (t  1) .5711 .7978 .3611
Performance (t  2) .8373 .3785 .4408
Classes ! .0001** .0001** .5401
Expense ratio:
Pass-through fee .2640 .9763 .2638
12b-1 Fee ! .0001** ! .0001** .6568
Management fee ! .0001** .1265 ! .0001**
Note. Estimates are for specifications (1)–(3) in model 2 in Table 7.
* Significant at p ! .05 or better.
** Significant at p ! .01 or better.
of transfer, taking into account fee income, merging within a family earlier than
between families, and liquidating only after extracting management fees for
longer. Further evidence supporting a pecking order for the timing and method
of mutual fund failure is contained in Table 8.
With partial likelihood estimations, such as Cox regression, it is possible to
test directly for coefficient differences using a Wald test (see Allison 1995). With
the Wald tests in Table 8, it is possible to determine the relative effect of each
factor on the timing of each type of exit. These tests reveal that the effects of
management fees on the hazard of liquidation and between-family merger in
which the manager loses the fee income are different from the effect of man-
agement fees on within-family merger but are not different from each other at
the p p .001 level or better. This evidence is consistent with the pecking-order
hypothesis, which proposes that managers or sponsors will prefer methods that
retain fee income (higher hazard) over those that lose income (lower hazard,
negative coefficient estimates). Tests of differential impact for fund age also
support the pecking-order hypothesis. The hazard of liquidation is a negative
function of age. The hazard of within-family and between-family mergers is an
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increasing function of age. The liquidation and merger coefficient estimates are
statistically different at conventionally accepted levels only with regard to within-
family merger. The estimated effect of age on merger hazard is statistically greater
for within-family mergers than between-family mergers. Stated in terms of length
of life, the longer the fund has survived, the less likely it is to be liquidated and
the more likely it is to be merged.
5. Conclusions
The evidence we present on the choice and timing of mutual fund exit mode
is consistent with a view in which the mode and timing of the exit decision is
impacted by the retention of managerial fee income, subject to board approval
where necessary. We find evidence of a pecking order for mutual fund exit mode
and timing in which there is a preference for within-family mergers over between-
family mergers or liquidation and in which exits that will reduce fee income or
cost alleviation are delayed. Funds with high 12b-1 and management fees are
liquidated more slowly than funds with low or no 12b-1 fees, and funds with
high 12b-1 and management fees are merged within family more quickly. This
is consistent with prior research suggesting that 12b-1 fees exacerbate the conflict
of interest inherent in the relationship between investment companies and
shareholders.
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